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Health, Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s
Armed Forces c.1665–1700
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Introduction
The early modern era saw important changes in the character of warfare in Europe,
including the development of larger,permanent armies and navies. Historians have studied
manykeyaspectsofwhatsomecallthe‘‘militaryrevolution’’,
1whosecharacterandtiming
have become a matter of debate;
2 but some important features of these emerging military
communities remain largely unexplored. One subject which has not attracted the attention
it merits is that of the health of soldiers and sailors and of medical provision in the new
armies and navies. The issue has not been entirely neglected, either generally,
3 or as it
relates to specific states,
4 but focused studies are rare.
5 This is unfortunate, not least
because of the importance attached to the issue of sickness and medical provision by
contemporaries, and the value of medical provision as a sort of test case by which to
measure the effectiveness of medical services and hence to contribute to the ‘‘military
revolution’’ debate. For some historians the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw
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1See Geoffrey Parker, The military revolution:
militaryinnovationandtheriseofthewest1500–1800,
Cambridge University Press, 1988, passim.
2See Clifford J Rogers (ed.), The military
revolution debate: readings on the military
transformation of early modern Europe, Boulder, CO,
Westview Press, 1995.
3SeeAndrewCunninghamandOlePeterGrell,The
four horsemen of the Apocalypse: religion, wars,
famine and death in Reformation Europe, Cambridge
University Press, 2000, pp. 92–199; Ole Peter Grell,
‘War, medicine and the military revolution’, in Peter
Elmer (ed.), The healing arts: health, disease and
society in Europe, 1500–1800, Manchester and Milton
Keynes, Manchester University Press and the Open
University,2004, pp. 257–83; and Peter Elmer and Ole
PeterGrell(eds),Health,diseaseandsocietyinEurope,
1500–1800: a source book, Manchester and Milton
Keynes, Manchester University Press and the Open
University, 2004, pp. 256–81.
4For France, see Colin Jones, ‘The welfare of the
Frenchfoot-soldier’,History,1980,65:193–213;idem,
The charitable imperative: hospitals and nursing in
ancien regime and revolutionary France, London,
Routledge, 1989; Lawrence Brocklissand Colin Jones,
The medical world of early modern France, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 689–700; and Guy
Rowlands,ThedynasticstateandthearmyunderLouis
XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661–1701,
Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 97–8. For
England,seeCharlesGCruickshank,Elizabeth’sarmy,
2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, pp. 174–88;
C R Butt, ‘Army medical services in 1644’, Journal of
the Society for Army Historical Research (hereafter
JSAHR), 1957, 35: 135; R V Steele, ‘Marlborough’s
campaigns’, JSAHR, 1921, 1: 126; G E Gask, ‘A
contribution tothe careofthe sickand wounded during
Marlborough’s march to the Danube in 1704 and at the
battleofBlenheim’,JournaloftheRoyalArmyMedical
Corps, 1922, 4: 274–88; and David Stewart, ‘Some
early military hospitals’, JSAHR, 1950, 28: 174–9.
5Some general studies of early modern warfare do
discuss medical provision and the need for it, see, for
example, Frank Tallett, War and society in early
modernEurope,1495–1715,London,Routledge,1992,
pp. 105–12.
325thefirstsignificanteffortstodevelopastructureofmilitaryandnavalhospitals;
6forothers,
however, the extent of illness and the inadequacy of medical support services before the
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic era suggests that many states failed to meet the
organizational challenge posed by the growth of standing armed forces in the sixteenth,
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
7 What follows is an investigation of the extent and
nature of illness, and the effectiveness of medical provision in the armies and navies of one
majorplayeroftheperiod,SpaininthereignofthelastHabsburg,CharlesII(1665–1700).
8
In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century Spain dominated western Europe by
means of its formidable fighting forces—above all its famous tercios—which benefited
from the development of precocious support services, including military hospitals,
9 in part
in response to the way disease depleted those units.
10 By the second half of the seventeenth
century, however, Spain was in retreat, militarily and territorially, before the rising power
of Louis XIV’s France. Unfortunately, but not entirely surprisingly, historians have shown
little interest in Spain’s armed forces—and in their support services—in this phase of
apparent ‘‘decline’’.
11 Indeed, although what we might call civilian medicine and related
topics in Charles II’s reign have attracted the attention of historians,
12 military medicine in
6Matthew Smith Anderson, War and society in
Europe of the old regime, 1618–1789, London,
Fontana, 1988, pp. 107–8. Anderson’s emphasis is on
eighteenth-century developments.
7See J€ u urgen Luh, Ancien regime warfare and the
military revolution: a study, Groningen, Instituut voor
Noord- en Oost-Europese Studies/Institute for
Northern and Eastern European Studies, 2000,
pp. 48–63.
8The medical history of the king himself has
attracted some interest, see Ramo ´n Garcı ´a Arg€ u uelles,
‘Vida y figura de Carlos II el Hechizado’, II Congreso
Espa~ n nol de Historia de la Medicina, Salamanca, 1965,
vol. 2, pp. 199–232, and C Liso ´n Tolosana,
‘Exorcismos en el Alca ´zar Real’, in idem, La Espa~ n na
mental, vol. 1: Demonios y exorcismos en los siglos de
oro, Los Berrocales del Jarama, 2 vols, Madrid, Akal,
1990, pp. 143–202.
9Geoffrey Parker, The army of Flanders and the
Spanish road, 1567–1659, Cambridge University
Press,1974,p.167(andpassim);Marı ´aJose ´ Rodrı ´guez
Salgado,Armada1588–1988,London,PenguinBooks,
1988, pp. 202–3; David Goodman, Power and penury:
government, technology and science in Philip II’s
Spain, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 238–50.
For the navy, see Carla Rahn Phillips, Six galleons for
the King of Spain: imperial defense in the early
seventeenth century, Baltimore and London, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 177–80.
According to W H Prescott (History of the reign of
Ferdinand and Isabella, 1882, vol. 1, p. 198), the field
hospitalsprovidedbyFerdinandandIsabelladuringthe
Granada War (1482–92)were the first exampleof their
kind, cited by A C W, ‘Medical care of soldiers’,
JSAHR,1925,4:219.However,rathersurprisingly,this
aspect of Spain’s military establishment has not
attracted the attention it merits. I A A Thompson, War
and government in Habsburg Spain, 1560–1620,
London, Athlone Press, 1976, for example, does not
discuss medical services. Such neglect makes it the
more difficult to compare the effectiveness of those
services before and after 1660.
10Charles V’s invasion force of Provence (1536)
was halved by disease and desertion: James D Tracy,
Emperor Charles V, impresario of war, Cambridge
University Press, 2002, p. 112.
11JohnTateLanning,Theroyalprotomedicato:the
regulation of the medical profession in the Spanish
empire, with preface by J J Te Paske (Durham, NC,
Duke University Press, 1985), largely ignores Spain
itself (and Europe), Spain’s armed forces, and the later
seventeenth century; the same is true of Michael E
Burke, The Royal College of San Carlos: surgery and
Spanish medical reform in the late eighteenth century,
with foreword by John Tate Lanning, Durham, NC,
Duke University Press, 1977.
12SeeJose ´ PardoToma ´sandAlvarMartı ´nezVidal,
‘El Tribunal del Protomedicato y los me ´dicos reales
(1665–1724)’, Dynamis, 1996, 16: 59–90; Marı ´a del
MarReyBuenoandMarı ´aEstherAlegrePe ´rez,‘Elreal
laboratorioquı ´mico(1693–1700)’, Dynamis, 1996, 16:
261–90; and Soledad Campos, ‘Las enfermerı ´as de
damas y criadas en la corte del siglo XVII’, Dynamis,
2002, 22: 59–83.
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13 Yet Spain continued to maintain large
numbers of men under arms—perhaps 100,000 in 1675—distributed among various
armies: above all the Army of Flanders, the Army of Lombardy and the Army of
Catalonia, the latter being the only one whose medical history in this period has
attracted any real interest.
14 These forces helped to ensure that Spain’s empire
remained largely intact in 1700, on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession
(1701–13). The following pages seek to throw some light on the medical history and
provision of the armies—and the navies—which contributed to the remarkable resi-
lience of the Spanish empire, or monarchy, in this testing period in view of some of the
problems identified above.
This is no easy task. Military (and naval) hospitals in Spain are separately archived only
from the eighteenth century. The historian seeking to reconstruct the medical services and
associated subjects in Habsburg Spain is therefore obliged to rely on official material
whichcoversamuchlargerandextremelydiverserangeofactivitiesandinstitutions.What
follows draws on the consultas—the formal discussions and recommendations in response
to letters from administrators and commanders in the field and at sea regarding the state of
their forces—of the Council of War, the Council of State, and the Council of the Cruzada
(responsible for funding the galleys), which are now housed in the Archivo General de
Simancas, outside Valladolid. These consultas have been supplemented by accounts relat-
ing to spending on the armed services found in the Contadurı´a Mayor de Cuentas series,
also housed at Simancas.
Unfortunately, these records are too vast to permit an exhaustive investigation. Each
year the Council of War’s secretariat of the land forces generated about thirty legajos—
bundles—each containing about one hundred consultas (and accompanying documents),
and the secretariat of the sea forces generated more than ten. In 1693, for example, the
former produced thirty-four bundles and the latter twelve. In addition, and perhaps
more importantly, the legajos of both Councils remain uncatalogued, making it impos-
sible to identify legajos containing consultas on medical issues (rather than on matters
of recruitment, supply, weaponry and so on). In order to overcome this problem, it was
decided—besides using material already acquired in previous work in the relevant
Spanish archives—to adopt a sampling approach, consulting the legajos for well-spaced
groups of years (1673–76, 1683–86 and 1693–96, all years of war). Inevitably, this
method has its drawbacks: it risks missing important developments in unsampled years,
and may result in a rather episodic and impressionistic picture of health/sickness and
medical provision in the Spanish armed forces. Nevertheless, it does make possible the
identification of the extent and type of illness, the range of medical provision, its
13David Gentilcore, Healers and healing in early
modern Italy, Manchester University Press, 1998, an
otherwisesplendidstudyofmedicineinSpanishNaples
focuses on ‘‘civil’’ medicine.
14SeeAntonioEspinoLo ´pez,Catalunyaduranteel
reinado de Carlos II: polı´tica y guerra en la frontera
catalana 1679–1697, Barcelona, Universitat
Aut  o onoma de Barcelona, 1999, pp. 219–38; and
Antonio Espino Lo ´pez, ‘Enfermedad y muerte en el
eje ´rcito de Catalu~ n na durante la Guerra de los Nueve
A~ n nos, 1689–1697’, Dynamis, 1996, 16: 427–44.
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700success or failure—and the reasons for these—in Spain’s armed forces in general in the
last Habsburg decades.
15 Although focused on Spain, it is hoped that elucidation of
these subjects will enhance our knowledge and understanding of military medicine
across early modern Europe as a whole, and of non-military medicine in Spain itself.
16
A preliminary effort will be made to identify the scale of the medical problem, and the
nature and cause of sickness; the focus will then shift to medical provision, and to the
difficulties facing it—above all to the want of funding, the bugbear of Habsburg Spain.
The Extent of the Problem
We need first to gain some idea of the numbers of the sick and wounded in order to
identify the scale of the problem and how it compared with other threats to man-
power—notably loss by desertion—and also to assess both its implications and the
success or failure of the military medical services. This is not easy, because, although it
has been suggested that sickness and death rates were higher among soldiers than
among the civilian population in general,
17 the sources for the military—essentially
relaciones, or summaries, sent to Madrid of the periodic muestras, or musters, con-
ducted by officials of the army pay office, and other reports giving details of sick and
wounded soldiers (and sailors)—are, again, patchy. In addition, they often fail to give
precise figures of the number of enfermos, or sick. In the summer of 1676, the
authorities of Fuenterrabı ´a (an important garrison town on the Bay of Biscay, close
to the border with France) complained to the king that, due to neglect, many of the
soldiers recently levied for its garrison had fallen ill. Claiming there were far too many
for the hospital there to accommodate, the authorities feared for both Fuenterrabı ´a’s
security and the health of the townsfolk. Unfortunately, however they did not say how
many sick there were.
18 Even where a figure is given, it is not always separated from
that for other sources of loss of men, notably desertion. In 1694, for example, 34 of a
15Theonlyotherstudiesofthissubjectarethoseby
AntonioEspinoLo ´pez,citedinnote14above.Lorraine
White, ‘The experience of Spain’s early modern
soldiers: combat, welfare and violence’, War in
History, 2001, 9: 1–20, covers the period to 1668. In
addition, Luis Antonio Ribot Garcı ´a, La monarquı´ad e
Espa~ n na y la guerra de Mesina (1674–1678), Madrid,
Actas, 2002, pp. 457–60, discusses medical provision
forthetroopsduringtheMessinarebellion.Asthetitles
suggest, these otherwise excellent studies are narrower
in focus—intimescale,servicearm andlocation—than
the present paper.
16In general, see the references in Lanning, op.
cit., note 11 above, and Burke, op. cit., note 11
above. Spanish demographic history has both
depended upon and stimulated research into medical
history; see the references in Pedro Ruiz Torres, ‘El
paı ´s valenciano en el siglo XVIII: la transformacio ´n
de una sociedad agraria en la e ´poca de absolutismo’,
in Roberto Ferna ´ndez (ed.), Espa~ n na en el siglo
XVIII: homenaje a Pierre Vilar, Barcelona, Crı ´tica,
1985, pp. 132–248, on pp. 155–69, 229; Guy
Lemeunier, ‘El reino de Murcia en el siglo XVIII:
realidad y contradicciones del crecimiento’, in ibid.,
pp. 289–341, on p. 298; and Eloy Ferna ´ndez
Clemente and Guillermo Pe ´rez Sarrio ´n, ‘El siglo
XVIII en Arago ´n: una economı ´a dependiente’, in
ibid., pp. 565–629, on pp. 588–9.
17Tallett, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 105.
18Consulta of Council of War, 7 Aug. 1676,
enclosing letter from the authorities in Fuenterrabı ´a,
Archivo General de Simancas [AGS]/Guerra Antigua
[GA]/[legajo] 2346.
328
Christopher Storrstotal of 772 men of the tercio of Granada sent to Ma ´laga to embark for Catalonia fell
ill, died or deserted en route but our source does not quantify the different categories.
19
Fortunately, some other records do more precisely distinguish between sick and
wounded, revealing the extent of both of these and—our main concern—the fluctuating
levelsofsickness,measuredbythenumberofthoserecordedasenfermo,orill.Theautumn
and winter months were those in which illness was most evident,
20 the spring and summer
less so. In October 1690, as the campaigning season drew to a close, the reviews of the
Army of Lombardy, revealed that, of a total of 2,912 cavalrymen, 98—more than 33 per
cent—were enfermo.
21 Sickness rates among the cavalry may have been greater than those
intheinfantry.InMarchandApril1691,accordingtoanother reviewcarriedoutbeforethe
troops left their winter quarters to open the campaign, the Army of Lombardy included
1,274 sick infantrymen, more than 10 per cent of a total of 11,190 officers and men;
22 by
earlyJune1691,thenumberofenfermosamongtheinfantryhadfallento1,164ofatotalof
15,416 officers and men—just 7.5 per cent.
23 This problem also affected the Army of
Flanders and that of Catalonia. In June 1693, the viceroy of Catalonia claimed that illness
was rife in his army: there were 1,000 men in the military hospitals of Barcelona and
Rosas.
24 Some years later, in the spring of 1696, another viceroy declared that there were
usually 1,500 sick during the campaign; at that moment, before the campaign had started,
there were 400 sick in his hospitals.
25 Within a few months, with the campaign underway,
there were twice that number, 800, in the Convento de Jes  u us hospital in Barcelona alone.
26
The following year, in July 1697, of a total force of 4,140, 565 soldiers of the Spanish
tercios in Catalonia were said to be ill—more than 10 per cent.
27
19Jose ´ LuisNavarroPe ´rez,‘Aportacio ´necono ´mica
y militar de la ciudad de Granada a las guerras del
reinado de Carlos II’, Chronica Nova, 1971, 6: 9–77,
pp. 73, 62. In 1695, of 855 men of the same tercio who
marched to Ma ´laga, 24 were lost in the same ways.
20Espino Lo ´pez, ‘Enfermedad y muerte’, op. cit.,
note 14 above, pp. 438–9 (figures for the Army of
Catalonia for 1689, 1692, and 1695).
21Relacio ´ndelamuestra...pasadoen9deoctubre
a toda la cavallerı´a del eje ´rcito, AGS/Estado [E], leg.
3413/67; Relacio ´n de la muestra ...pasado en 9 de
octubre a toda la infanterı´a del exe ´rcito, AGS/E/3413/
68.Italsorevealedthat,ofatotalof8,294infantrymen,
2044 (25 per cent) were sick or wounded. On the Army
of Lombardy, and its fluctuating size, see Christopher
Storrs, ‘The Army of Lombardy and the resilience of
Spanish power in Italy in the reign of Carlos II (1665–
1700), (Part I), War in History, 1997: 4: 371–98, and
(Part II), War in History, 1998, 5: 1–22.
22Relacio ´n de la muestra que se ha pasado en las
plazasatodalainfanterı´aycavallerı´adesteexe ´rcitoen
diferentes dı´as de los meses de marzo y abril 1691,
AGS/E/3414/213. Unfortunately, there is no record of
the incidence of illness among the cavalry.
23Relacio ´nsumariadelamuestra...passado...a
todalainfanterı´aycavallerı´adelexe ´rcitoen9dejunio
de 1691, AGS/E/3415/28. Again, nothing is said about
the cavalry. In all Spain’s armies, the proportion of
infantry was greater than that of cavalry, although the
proportion varied and that of the cavalry was generally
increasing in the later seventeenth century.
24Consulta of Council of War, 27 June 1693, on
DukeofMedinaSidoniato[?],20June1693,AGS/GA/
2913. The year 1693 was unusually bad in this respect,
see Espino Lo ´pez, Catalunya, op. cit., note 14 above,
p. 225.
25Consulta of Council of War, 12 May 1696,
AGS/GA/3013.
26Don Juan de Alva Marque ´zt o[ ?],
26 June 1696, Barcelona, AGS/GA/3013.
27Relacio ´n que han dado los tercios de espa~ n noles
de la gente de sus cuerpos que es en la manera
siguiente, 20 July 1697, Archivo de la Casa Ducal de
Alburquerque, Cue ´llar, leg. 536/4. Among the Italian,
Walloon and German infantry units of the Army of
Catalonia it was much worse: there were 707 sick—
well over 20 per cent—of a total of 3,266 men. This
relacio ´n did not include those ill in the hospital. For
rates of illness (and desertion) in various units of the
Army of Catalonia between 1673 and 1695, see Espino
Lo ´pez, ‘Enfermedad y muerte’, op. cit., note 14 above,
pp. 430–1.
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700Menoftenbecame illagooddistancefromthefrontline.Inthesummerof1676,manyof
those recruited in Ma ´laga and Murcia fell ill while waiting to embark at Cartagena; when
416menandofficersdidatlasttakeshiptheyleftbehind80inthehospital.
28Yearslater,in
1693, eight men in a contingent of well over 500 awaiting embarkation for Flanders at
Ca ´diz either died or were dismissed because of their incurable illnesses.
29 The journey to
the front might also be difficult, whether by sea in small, crowded and often insanitary
transport ships, or overland. In the summer of 1694, a tercio recruited in the Canaries for
the Army of Flanders reached Ostend—via England—in a wretched state: of 433 men who
had embarked in the Canaries, over 200 had fallen ill during the voyage, and 56 had either
deserted (in England) or died.
30 On dry land the journey—from the towns of Castile to a
port of embarkation or to the front in Catalonia—could involve many days of marching,
often in adverse conditions.
31 In 1684, of 2,002 men (and 104 officers) recruited in Madrid
for the five Castilian provincial tercios serving in Catalonia, 60 did not reach their destina-
tion: 16 deserted, 4 died and 40 (2 per cent of the original levy) fell ill en route.
32
Sickness was not only a problem in Spain’s armies; it also affected her navies, notably
the Atlantic or High Seas Fleet, the so-called Armada del Mar Oceano, and the various
squadrons (of Spain, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia and Genoa, that is the galleys hired from the
Duke of Tursi) which made up Spain’s Mediterranean galley fleet, and which averaged a
total of twenty-eight to thirty vessels. In February 1675 there were 900 sick aboard the
Atlantic fleet, which was participating in the reduction of the Messina revolt against
Spanish rule, a figure which subsequently rose to 1,500.
33 Nine years later, in the spring
of1684,thenumberofsickontheAtlanticfleetthenatCartagenatotalledbetween700and
800; this necessitated the construction of more than 250 additional beds in the hospital
there, and also outstripped the resources of the neighbouring towns of Lorca and Murcia
28Consulta of Council of War, 14 Sept. 1676, on
various letters from Don Antonio Martı ´nez Valera,
Governor of Cartagena, AGS/GA/2346. See also
consulta of Council of War, 24 Sept. 1676, on letter
from Don Pablo de Guzma ´n, 6 Sept. 1676, AGS/GA/
3592. In 1689, 400 men levied in Galicia for the Army
of Flanders fell ill and died because of the delays in
organizing their transport to the Low Countries:
Consulta of State, 11 Jan. 1691, on Marquis of
Gasta~ n naga to Charles II, 6 Dec. 1690, AGS/E/3884.
29Consulta of Council of War, 13 Jan. 1694, on
letterfromtheCountofMontijo,2Jan.1694,AGS/GA/
2916. According to a report received only weeks later,
18 had died and 130 were sick: consulta of Council of
War,3Mar.1694,onletterfromMontijo,24Jan.1694,
AGS/GA/2947.
30Consulta of council of State, 26 June 1694, and
accompanying documentsrelating to musteratOstend,
AGS/E/3888. The men might have arrived in a worse
stateiftheSpanishambassadorinEngland,theMarquis
ofCanales,hadnotarrangedtheirtransporttoFlanders,
see the contract he agreed with one Roland White,
27 April 1694, including details of the rations—1.5 lbs
of bread or biscuit a day, 1 lb of meat, 0.5 lb of cheese,
2 pints of beer and fresh water for the men—to be
enjoyed on the crossing, AGS/E/3887. For the
destructive effect of a sea journey on British troops
going to Spain in a later conflict, see C T Atkinson,
‘The cost of Queen Anne’s war’, JSAHR, 1955,
33: 174–83, p. 180.
31In 1693, recruits marching from Valladolid to
embarkatSanSebastia ´nforFlandersfacedfifteendays
on the road, and those marching from Jae ´n (Andalucı ´a)
to Ca ´diz, eleven days, Presupuesto, 27 Nov. 1693,
AGS/GA/2916. The march from Leo ´n to Catalonia
clearly involved a much longer, and more demanding,
trail across Castile and Aragon.
32Consulta of Council of War, 24 May 1684, on a
paper from Don Melchor Portocarrero, 18 May 1684,
AGS/GA/2610. At the end of 1693, 66 recruits left
Valladolid for Pamplona, leaving behind 16 others—
justover20percentofthetotal—whohadfallenilland,
it was hoped, would follow once they had recovered,
consultaofCouncilofWar,13Jan.1694,onletterfrom
CountofMontijo,2Jan.1694,AGS/GA/2916.In1694,
thepaymasterofrecentleviesintherealmofLeo ´nspent
morethan7,000maravedı´sonthetreatmentofthesick,
and another 680 on the burial of two recruits recently
arrived from neighbouring Asturias, AGS/Contadurı ´a
MayordeCuentas[CMC]/TerceraE ´poca[3a]/3042/29.
33Ribot Garcı ´a, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 217.
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Christopher Storrswhich were called on to help shoulder the burden.
34 As for the galleys, in the spring of
1664, more than 100 men—the equivalent of 50 per cent of the complement of one
galley—were said to have died since June of the previous year aboard the five galleys
of the Duke of Tursi.
35
Just as we cannot always accept at face value official figures on the number of soldiers
and sailors in service, so we cannot accept without question the official numbers of
enfermos. Some at least of those recorded as ill were probably malingerers. In the summer
of 1692, a trawl through the general hospital (of Santa Cruz or Santa Creu) at Barcelona,
resulted in a number of those soldiers said not to be genuinely sick being ordered back to
their regiments.
36Someofthosewhowere acknowledged tobeillwere notsomuchsickas
aging and suffering a decline in their physical capabilities which rendered them less fit for
active service. In 1694, for example, the alfe ´rez, or junior official, Don Andre ´s Segarle
petitioned for a racio ´n de enfermo, or sick ration,in the Hospital Real, claiming that he had
served in the Spanish galleys for more than twenty-four years and was now too short-
sightedtocontinue.
37 Some ofthe sick maynothave existed atall.InDecember1695there
were said to be an unspecified number of sick soldiers in the Army of Catalonia both in the
military hospital and in private houses. But there was some suspicion that at least some of
these enfermos were the invention of officers fraudulently seeking tosupplement their own
pay.
38 The existence of royal hospitals in which the sick and wounded could be both
properly cared for and also counted was thus in part at least a weapon in the constant
struggle waged by the king and his ministers against the corrupt practices of their own
officers.
Despite these reservations about the real extent of illness, sickness among Spain’s
soldiers and sailors was a serious problem for commanders in the field and for their
masters in Madrid who depended on the effectiveness of those forces to achieve their
strategic objectives: without sufficient men to pull the oars, for example, the galleys—the
lifeline of the Spanish empire in the Mediterranean—simply could not put to
sea.
39 Sickness could reduce the galleys’ operational effectiveness. In the summer of
1693, the level of illness among the oarsmen of the two galleys of the squadron
34Consultas of Junta de Armadas, 6 April and 6
May 1684, AGS/GA/3709. There were said to be more
than500sickinthenavalhospitalatCa ´dizinMay1684.
ThiswascertifiedbytheveedorgeneraloftheArmada,
as part of the relacio ´n de servicios of Don Juan
Guerrero,protome ´dicooftheAtlanticfleet,Madrid,23
Sept. 1688, AGS/GA/Servicios/42.
35Seecertificateofthenumberofdeathsaboardthe
galleys of the Duke of Tursi’s squadron since 9 June
1663, Barcelona, 27 March 1664, AGS/E/3611/113.
They included 42 forzados (convicted criminals
sentencedtothegalleys),35buenasboyas(volunteers),
and 27 slaves, a total of 104. In January 1675 the
capitana (flagship) of the Spanish galley squadron
alone had more than 130 sick, besides many
convalescents, Ribot Garcı ´a, op. cit., note 15 above,
p. 217.
36EspinoLo ´pez,Catalunya,op.cit.,note14above,
p. 256.
37Consulta of Junta de Galeras, 3 April 1694, on
report of Don Andre ´s Segarle, AGS/GA/3906. The
junta consulted the commander of the galleys, who
supported the request and sent a certificate from the
doctorandsurgeonofthegalleysconfirmingtheclaim.
38Consulta of Council of War, 4 April 1696, on
letters from the Marquis of Gasta~ n naga, 9 and 11 Dec.
1695, and a letter from the veedor general of the Army
ofCatalonia(onrecentmusteroftroops),15Dec.1695,
AGS/GA/3011.
39In 1664, the Duke of Tursi claimed that he
could not execute royal orders to detach two of his
galleys to carry money to Italy because of the
shortage of oarsmen, due to the many deaths aboard
during their sojourn off the Spanish coast, consulta
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700of Sardinia—on 11 August, there were 94 being treated in the hospital of the arsenal of
Naples and 60 convalescents—obliged them to return to Sardinia rather than accompany
the other galleys to Catalonia for the campaign.
40
Ill health was not the only reason why numbers dwindled. Military and naval historians
have tended to focus on the loss of military manpower resulting from desertion.
41 How-
ever, while this generally caused the loss of more men than did sickness, it was not always
so.
42 In addition, fear of sickness and death no doubt explained why some—many—did
desert.
43 Commanders and ministers in other states faced similar problems.
44 However,
Spain—and above all Castile, the traditional reservoir from which Spain’s armies were
supplied within the Iberian peninsula—had suffered a major demographic setback in the
early seventeenth century. Population figures in the later seventeenth century may have
been recovering, but the reserves of manpower from which to make good any losses,
whatever their origin,
45 were certainly less than in some other states—notably France—
thereby contributing to the overall decline in the size of Spain’s armed forces.
The Nature and Origin of the Problem
Illness was therefore a serious problem. But the sick were no simple category; on the
contrary,soldiersandsailorsneededmedicaltreatmentforagreatvariety ofreasons. Some
of these were more obviously ‘‘military’’ than others. In addition, the military community
was a large and diverse body and some types of soldier were more prone to need treat-
ment—of whatever kind—than were others.
When seeking to explain why those in Spain’s armed forces between 1665 and 1700
needed medical assistance, we must distinguish between those wounded in action—by
of Council of State, Madrid, 19 May 1664,
AGS/E/3611/109.
40Consulta of State, 7 Nov. 1693, AGS/E/3226/13,
onvariousdocuments,includingthecertificationofthe
extent of illness by Doctor Jaime Sayo, me ´dico of the
Sardinian galleys, Naples, 11 August 1693. According
to the Savoyard minister in Naples, many of the sick
later died: Gian Battista Operti to Marquis of San
Tommaso, 7 July 1693, Archivio di Stato di Torino
[AST], Lettere Ministri [LM], Napoli o Due Sicilie,
mazzo 5. In 1695, too, the departure of the Neapolitan
galleys from Naples was delayed by the lack of men,
manyof whomwere ill. It wasfeared that thosegalleys
would not get away until end May at the earliest, after
the opening of the campaign season, with important
implications for Spain’s ability to prevent the French
seizing the initiative in the Mediterranean, Operti to
San Tommaso, 25 Feb. 1695, AST/LM/Napoli, m. 6.
41Anderson, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 128–30.
42Between 1673 and 1695, losses sustained by
various units in the Army of Catalonia through
desertion on all but one occasion (1674–75) for which
we have data were greater than the losses sustained
throughillness,butwhereasin1695(tercioofDonJoan
Copons)therespectivecontributionswere74.6percent
and 17.8 per cent, in 1694–95 (tercio of the city of
Barcelona) they were 30.7 per cent and 28.2 per cent,
Espino Lo ´pez, ‘Enfermedad y muerte’,op. cit., note 14
above, p. 431. Unfortunately, want of data for all units
over long periods makes sustained and meaningful
comparison between different units—and for the same
unit over a long time—virtually impossible.
43This happened in Catalonia in 1639, see Luis R
Corteguera, For the common good: popular politics in
Barcelona, 1580–1640, Ithaca and London, Cornell
University Press, 2002, p. 151.
44SeeRowlands,op.cit.,note4above,pp. 208–12.
45See Vicente Pe ´rez Moreda, Las crisis de
mortalidad en la Espa~ n na interior siglos XVI–XIX,
Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1980, pp. 107–12; and Bartolome ´
Yun Casalilla, ‘Del centro a la periferia: la economı ´a
Espa~ n nola bajo Carlos II’, Studia Historica. Historia
Moderna, 1999, 20: 45–76, on pp. 51–3.
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Christopher Storrsenemy grenade, shot or blade
46—and those who were otherwise sick, although the dis-
tinctioncannot always berigidlymaintained, asa woundmightresult insome othertype of
infection or illness. A report on those being treated in the general hospital in Barcelona in
July 1697 was clear on this: of a total of 392 inmates, it identified 225 wounded (218
infantrymen and 7 cavalrymen) and 167 sick.
47
It has been suggested that changes in the way war was fought in the later seventeenth
century—above all the more effective use of fire-power—made for both new and more
serious types of wound, and an increasein casualty rates.
48 Certainly,Spain’s armed forces
were frequently in action, defending Spain and its empire against Louis XIV, the forces of
the king of Morocco (in north Africa), and others; and action meant casualties. In north
Italy, in 1690 and again in 1693, the Army of Lombardy suffered when the forces of Spain
and its ally the Duke of Savoy were defeated in battle by those of the French king.
49 Even
success could be costly: in 1692, the Army of Lombardy incurred further casualties during
the allied invasion of Dauphine ´.
50 The Army of Flanders also suffered in action. In 1674,
the number of Spanish dead and wounded at the bloody battle of Seneffe was put at over
3,000; and in 1678 the Spanish forces again incurred substantial losses at the battle of Saint
Denis.
51 The Army of Catalonia, too, was plagued by losses: the number of dead, wounded
and deserters recorded after defeat at the hands of Louis XIV’s forces at the battle of the
river Ter (1694) totalled 3,255.
52
Identifying the extent and nature of wounds is not always easy, although the relacio ´nes
de servicios, accounts of services of individual soldiers prepared when they sought or were
beingconsideredforan appointment,orothermerced,orroyalfavour,often provideuseful
information in this respect.
53 Death and wounding in action—and some peculiarly military
conditions such as trench foot and shell shock
54—were, however, less common than other
46Don Manuel del Castillo Alvarado was said to
have been wounded by a grenade at Puigcerda
according to a consulta of the Council of War, 1699,
AGS/GA/3908, proposing candidates for the vacant
post of sargento mayor in the tercio of Don Juan
Ferna ´ndez de Aguirre. The same consulta informs us
that Don Gregorio Caldero ´n was wounded at the siege
of Camprodon, and Don Juan Ambrosio Enrı ´quez y
Zarate at the siege of Barcelona (1697).
47Relacio ´n de los oficiales y soldados que los
tercios y companias de infanterı´a y cavallerı´a del exto
se hallan heridos en el Hospl. Genl. de Sta. Cruz de
Barcelona el dı´a 21 de jullio de 1697, Archivo de la
Casa Ducal de Alburquerque, Cue ´llar, leg. 536/4. The
units with most wounded were the permanent (or
regular ones) rather than those of the Principality of
Catalonia and of Barcelona.
48Cunningham and Grell, op. cit., note 3 above,
p. 125; Grell, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 258–60; David
G Chandler, ‘Armies and navies’, in J S Bromley (ed.),
The new Cambridge modern history, vol. 6: The rise of
Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1715/25, Cambridge
University Press, 1970, pp. 741–62, on p. 749.
49Seventy cavalrymenwere said to havedied and a
further 191 to have been wounded at the battle of
Staffarda in 1690: consulta of State, [20 Sept.] 1690,
AGS/E/3412/106 and 110. Spain’s losses in the battle
of Marsagliain 1693 totalled more than3,000: AGS/E/
3656/3, 6 and 7. The heaviest losses in 1693 were
sustainedbythe(Spanish)terciosofLombardy,Naples
and Savoy.
50See Marquis of Legane ´s to Charles II, 17 Aug.
1692, AGS/E/3417, 86 giving an account of the
progress of the allies and telling of 40 Spanish
casualties (dead and wounded) in the siege of Embrun.
51See Relacio ´n, printed in Coleccio ´nd e
documentos ine ´ditos para la historia de Espa~ n na, 95,
Madrid, 1890, pp. 59, 72–7.
52EspinoLo ´pez,Catalunya,op.cit.,note14above,
p. 137.
53Therelacio ´ndeserviciosofthecaptain,DonJuan
de Torres Mantia, Madrid, 30 Jan. 1697, AGI/Panama ´/
181, fol. 102. The captain had received a bullet wound
in the ankle.
54Parker,op.cit.note9above,p.169;Grell,op.cit.,
note 3 above, p. 275.
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55 As for the sick(rather than the wounded), it isoften difficultto be precise about
the nature of the illness or its cause. There was frequently little difference between the
infections of soldiers and those of civilians.
56 In the spring of 1693, many new recruits in
Naples were said to be in hospital with ‘‘the French disease’’, i.e. venereal infection.
57 The
troops might sometimes simply be the victims of a general contagion affecting the entire
(civilian)population.Thiswas,forexample,thecaseatCartagena—amajornavalbaseand
embarkation point—where in 1676 some soldiers were struck down by the plague then
entering Spain; as late as September there were still said to be 6 soldiers in the infirmary
there affected by plague.
58 Of course, as large communities, armies (and fleets, even
squadrons of ships or galleys) were ideal locations for the spread of disease. In the Spanish
Low Countries, in 1693 the governor-general reported that his troops had been greatly
reduced by an epidemic which had dogged them throughout the campaign.
59
However,thevulnerabilityofthetroopswasoftenexacerbatedbytheauthorities’failure
properly to provide for them. We have already seen that delays in embarking men and the
sea journey or overland march could result in illness and even death. The campaign season
was also very demanding because of the combination of strenuous activity, often in
difficult climatic conditions, lack of rest, stress, and—again—inadequate provisions.
60
In October 1667 the governor of the Spanish Low Countries informed Mariana of Austria
(who acted as regent during Charles II’s minority, between 1665 and 1675) that sickness,
fatigue,the continuedmarchesand‘‘miseries’’ofcampaigningmeant thathenowhadonly
2,000 Spaniards under his command.
61 Nor were these problems confined to those oper-
ating on land. The men on the galleys were also likely to fall ill during or after prolonged
exertion,
62 especially in difficult weather well into the campaign season: a demanding sea
voyage late in the previous year seems to have been a factor in the unusual levels of illness
in the fleet in the spring of 1684.
63
55Tallett, op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 106, 108.
56Ibid., p. 108.
57Operti to San Tommaso, Naples, 13 Mar. 1693,
AST/LM/Napoli, m. 5.
58Real cedula, 17 Oct. 1676, following consulta of
Council of War, 2 Oct. 1676, on letter of royal officials
at Cartagena, 22 Sept. 1676, AGS/GA/2360. On this
plague, see Henry Kamen, ‘The decline of Castile: the
last crisis’, Econ. Hist. Rev., 1964, 17: 63–76.
59MaxEmmanuelofBavariatoCharlesIIofSpain,
23 Oct. 1693, Brussels, in Henri Lonchay, et al. (eds),
Correspondancedelacourd’Espagne,vol.5:Pre ´cisde
la correspondance de Charles II (1665–1700),
Brussels, Acade ´mie Royale de Belgique, 1935, p. 597.
60For contemporary thinking on what soldiers
couldputupwith,seeAntonioEspinoLo ´pez,‘Oficiales
catalanes en el eje ´rcito de los Austrias, 1635–1700’,
Cuadernos de Historia Moderna, 2000, 24: 31–53,
p. 37.
61Consulta of council of State, 11 Nov. 1667, on
Constable of Castile to Queen Regent, 20 Oct. 1667,
AGS/E/2106.
62In 1661, 200 men were said to have died aboard
the Genoese galleys in the Spanish service following
demanding voyages to Oran and elsewhere, and, given
the many sick on board many more were also expected
to die, Diego de Laura (secretary) to Don Luis de
Oyanguren,Genoa,20Dec.1661,AGS/E/3610/75.See
also, Duke of Na ´jera to [Charles II?], Naples, 25 Feb.
1695, AGS/E/3326/17. In 1662 the Duke of Tursi
claimed that he could not execute the king’s order to
detach two of hisgalleys to transport CardinalColonna
to Spain because he had already given two galleys to
carry the Count of Pe~ n naranda, and the rest of his crews
were all sick after the exertions of a fourteen-month
voyage, Don Carlo Doria Carretto [Duke of Tursi] to
Philip IV, Genoa, 10 Oct. 1662, AGS/E/3611/160. The
Dukeaddedthat,ifheweretosail,hewouldhavetoput
into French ports where there was contagion, such that
he feared he would then not be allowed into Spanish
ports.
63Consultas of Junta de Armadas, 6 April and 6
May 1684, AGS/GA/3709.
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Christopher StorrsPoor quality or insufficient food was another distinctive cause of illness. In 1680, a
change in the daily diet of the men at the oars of the galleys apparently resulted in an
increase in the number of sick.
64 Unfortunately, the sources rarely distinguish between
malnutrition and food poisoning as the cause of illness, while there was always scope for
disagreement about the decisive element in any particular case. In 1695, more than 200
Portuguese soldiers—sent to defend Ceuta, one of Spain’s north African garrisons, against
the king of Morocco—fell ill. This was attributed to the poor quality bizcocho—a sort of
cake—the Portuguese had received (whereas the Spanish troops had good quality pan de
municio ´n, or standard issue bread).
65 According to the bishop of Ceuta, who investigated
the outbreak, the bizcocho had arrived late—and rather damp—because of stormy seas.
Then, because of a lack of storage space, some of the bizcocho had been housed in the
cathedral sacristy, where gesso was also stored for building work. However, according to
the doctors who also consulted, the real problem was not the food but the poor weather
and the constant fatigues—marches, night watches and so on—necessitated by the attacks
of the forces of the king of Morocco.
66 In extreme weather, both hot and cold, as well as
wet,inadequateaccommodationandalackofwoodforfires(bothforheatingandcooking)
also threatened the well-being and health of the troops.
67
Some among the troops were particularly vulnerable. Those most affected were pri-
marily—but not only—the rank and file. As might be expected,new recruits,as opposed to
experienced and hardened veterans, were most likely to fall ill. According to one report of
1684 all the newly raised men had fallen ill three or four times.
68 Raw recruits were, not
surprisingly, less able to support the rigours of campaigning, as was evident in 1684 in
Catalonia.
69Thiswasonegoodreasonforthewidespreadpreferenceforveterans—onenot
peculiar to Spanish commanders—men who were used to, and better able to overcome, the
hardships of army life. Unfortunately, however, the shortage of military manpower and the
resort to what was little short of impressment by Charles II’s ministers to fill the ranks,
ensuredthat the latter includedmanywith little experience of orinclination forthe military
life.
70 But even veterans fell ill if sufficiently stretched and insufficiently cared for, as
happened in the winter of 1677–78, in Sicily.
71 Others who were vulnerable included
foreign troops in the Spanish service, who were less used to the climate, above all the
summer heat, and to the foods of the peninsula.
72
64Cesa ´reo Ferna ´ndez Duro, Disquisiciones
na ´uticas, Madrid, Imprenta de Aribau, 1877 (facs. ed.,
Madrid, 1996, Ministerio de Defensa, Instituto de
Historia y Cultura Naval), vol. 2, pp. 134–5.
65Consulta of State, 7 May 1695, on Marquis of
SentmenattoCharlesII,Lisbon,26April1695,AGS/E/
4041, reporting the complaint of the Portuguese
Secretary of State; Count of Frigiliana to [?], 3 July
1695, enclosing report from the Portuguese envoy in
Madrid, AGS/E/4041.
66Consulta of State, 5 July 1695, on report of the
Marquis of Valparaı ´so, and certificates of doctors,
Ceuta, 10 June 1695, and veedor, Ceuta, 11 June 1695,
all in AGS/E/4041.
67Ribot Garcı ´a, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 458.
68Consulta of Council of War, 19 Oct. 1684, AGS/
GA/2609.
69EspinoLo ´pez,Catalunya,op.cit.,note14above,
pp. 59–60.
70Between 1695 and 1697, Charles II imposed a
fixedlevy(1percentofhouseholdsin1695,0.5percent
in1696and1.25percentin1697)torecruittheArmyof
Catalonia, Christopher Storrs, The resilience of the
Spanish monarchy 1665–1700, forthcoming, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 2006, pp. 40–45.
71Ribot Garcı ´a, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 463.
72This may well explain the contrasting rates of
illness between Spanish and non-Spanish units in the
ArmyofCataloniainthesummerof1697,asinnote27
above. Earlier, in 1662, Scots troops raised for service
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700Soldiers and sailors fell ill for many different reasons, not all of them ‘‘military’’ in
origin. These various causes had important implications for the incidence and timing of
sickness and need for medical treatment. However, whether obviously military or not,
perhaps the most important threat to the health and well-being of the armed forces was the
inadequacy of provision for them on the part of the military (and other) authorities.
Medical Services
Throughout Europe, writers on military affairs recognized the need to care for soldiers,
and to provide hospitals for them,
73 as did senior military officials and policy-makers in
Spain and its empire. This was a matter both of justice and prudence. On the one hand,
commanders and ministers acknowledged an obligation to those who had suffered in the
service of the king;
74 on the other, in a Spain where (as we have seen) population was at
best stagnant, and recruitment increasingly difficult, inadequate or poor treatment might
result in the illness—even the death—of tens, hundreds, and over a generation even
thousands of servicemen, soldiers, sailors, oarsmen and so on, who would be hard to
replace. Neglect might also encourage desertion and discourage others from joining
up. Ultimately, wastage though sickness might paralyse the king’s armed forces, and
jeopardize the defence of the monarchy, or component territories. Commanders and offi-
cials therefore gave thought and priority to the cure of the sick and wounded,
75 whose
treatment was the responsibility of an established and complex structure of medical
provision.
A network of military and naval medical services already existed in 1665. The senior
ranks of each regiment included a surgeon, although his salary was relatively low.
76 As for
the naval forces, each galleon had—or was supposed to have—its own complement of
me ´dico (doctor), cirujano (surgeon), and boticario (pharmacist), according to regulations
dating from the later sixteenth century.
77 Each galley too, had its own doctor and surgeon,
as did the various galley squadrons.
78 These men were frequently overseen by the
protome ´dico, effectively the chief medical officer of the unit and/or realm from which
it originated, although practice varied between the various territories of the monarchy.
79 In
intheIberianpeninsulahadbeenwarnedontheirarrival
in Portugal against excessive consumption of local
wine and fruit, P H Hardacre, ‘The English contingent
in Portugal, 1662–1668’, JSAHR, 1960, 38: 112–25,
p. 114.
73The Earl of Orrery, A treatise on the art of war,
London, 1677, pp. 53–4, cited by J H L, ‘Medical care
of soldiers’, JSAHR, 1925, 4: 58.
74Consulta of Council of War, 7 Oct. 1676, AGS/
GA/2436, and consultas of Junta de Armadas, 6 April
and 6 May 1684, AGS/GA/3709.
75Duke of Na ´jera to [Charles II?], Naples, 25 Feb.
1695, AGS/E/3326/17.
76In 1684, the officials of each of two new tercios
raised in the kingdom of Navarra included a surgeon
who enjoyed a salary of 150 reales, one of the lowest:
Relazio ´n de lo que importa un mes de sueldo sin
desquento del terzio, AGS/GA/2608. According to the
agreement forthree W€ u urttembergregimentsto serve in
Milan, concluded in 1690, the surgeonwould receive 9
scudi, less than the captain, alfe ´rez, sergeant, cabo
(corporal) or escrivano (clerk) and just over double
what a simple soldier received: AGS/E/3416, 167.
77Phillips, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 139.
78The galley squadron supplied on contract by the
Duke of Tursi had a hospital galley based in the Genoa
arsenal,seeDonCarloDoriaCarretto,DukeofTursi,to
Philip IV, Barcelona, 4 Mar. 1664, AGS/E/3611/99.
The five galley squadrons were those of Spain, Naples,
Sicily, Sardinia, and Tursi.
79The Castilian Tribunal of the Protomedicato
acquired wide responsibilities, including the
appointment of medical personnel to the armed forces,
but represented a different model to that of Aragon
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Christopher Storrs1693 the protome ´dico of the island kingdom of Sardinia confirmed the opinion of the
me ´dico of the galleys, which were then at Naples, that the oarsmen were in a poor state of
health.
80 Important garrisons, including Ceuta and Melilla,
81 had their own hospitals,
although in 1695–96, some at least of the Portuguese troops who had fallen ill at
Ceuta were also cared for in the hospitals of that other important fortress, Gibraltar.
82
Each unit would also have what we might call an unofficial, or informal female nursing
staff in the form of the prostitutes, wives and so on, who accompanied the troops and
supplied them with a variety of services.
83
The troops also enjoyed supra-regimental provision, above all in the form of hospitals
which catered for the entire army or fleet. The troops of the Army of Flanders in the later
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries could resort either to local charitable institutions
or to a special army hospital established at Mechelen in 1585, which in 1637 had 330
beds.
84 As for the Army of Catalonia, where a lack of effective medical facilities was
evident in the early stages of the war against France (from 1635),
85 the Casa or Hospital de
la Misericordia—a typical Counter-Reformation poor relief institution which had also
functioned as a royal military hospital during that conflict (until 1659)—had been handed
backtothecityauthoritiesin1663inreturnforapromisethatsoldierswouldbecaredforin
the general hospital, the Santa Cruz. This provision was supplemented by the existence of
other royal military hospitals in the fortresses of Gerona, Palamo ´s and Rosas.
86
Asforthefleet,from1630thecrewsofthegalleysofSpainhadenjoyedthefacilitiesofa
new hospital at Puerto de Santa Marı ´a on Spain’s Atlantic coast.
87 However, the transfer of
the galleys in 1669 to Cartagena, on Spain’s Mediterranean coast
88 made necessary the
development of facilities at the new base: in 1674 the queen regent ordered the Council of
the Cruzada—which was responsible for the funding of the galleys—to pay 200 ducats
(which influenced the development of that of Spanish
Naples),Gentilcore,op.cit.,note13above,p.32.There
is a substantial literature on the protomedicato of the
various realms of the early modern Spanish monarchy.
In addition to the work of Lanning, note 11 above, see
the various contributions to the monograph volume of
Dynamis, 2002, 22: devoted to El tribunal del real
protomedicatoenlamonarquı´ahispa ´nica,1593–1808.
80AGS/E/3852/17. The protome ´dico examined the
men bench by bench. He foundthe troops on board and
the sailors fine, but the rowers—crucial to the ship’s
ability to move—for the most part either convalescent
or too weak. For the protome ´dico of the Armada de las
Indias, see Lanning, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 128.
Lanning’s is the best general study of the system of the
protomedicato in the Spanish empire, although it
largely ignores Spain itself (and Europe).
81Consulta of Council of War, 24 Feb. 1699, AGS/
GA/3125.Fortheprotome ´dicooftheArmyofFlanders,
1675, see AGS/E/2280/14.
82Consulta of State, 5 July 1695, on report of the
Marquis of Valparaı ´so on the ‘‘epidemic’’ sweeping
through the Portuguese troops, AGS/E/4041. See
accounts of the paymaster of the garrison of Ca ´diz and
proveedor general of Andalucı ´a, Jan. to April 1696,
AGS/CMC/3a/2982/22.
83In 1684 the Governor of the Low Countries
claimed that his troops constituted not an army but a
collection of young people, old men, women and a
small number of real soldiers, Marquis of Grana to
Charles II, 31 May 1684, Lonchay, et al. (eds), op. cit.,
note 59 above, p. 449. See also Tallett, op. cit., note 5
above, p. 110, and Grell, op. cit., note 3 above,
pp. 258–9.
84Parker, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 167. In 1574
mutinous troops in Flanders had demanded a military
hospital, so this may have been a response to pressure
from ‘‘below’’: ibid., p. 191.
85Corteguera, op. cit., note 43 above, p. 145.
86EspinoLo ´pez,Catalunya,op.cit.,note14above,
p. 432
87Ferna ´ndez Duro, op. cit., note 64 above, vol. 3,
pp. 242–9.
88Ferna ´ndez Duro, op. cit., note 64 above, vol. 3,
p. 250.
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700towards the building of the hospital at Cartagena.
89 The first patients entered the new
hospital in the spring of 1675.
90 The Atlantic fleet had its own hospital at Ca ´diz,
91 with a
capacity in the 1690s of about 300.
92 By the end of the reign, the Ca ´diz hospital was the
lynchpin of a network of hospitals dotted around Andalucia which serviced the fleet.
93
Exceptionally high rates of sickness might necessitate extraordinary additional mea-
sures.In1684,theunusualextentofillnessintheAtlanticfleetatCa ´dizmadenecessarythe
provision of another 262 beds, plus other essential items, costing a total of 18,000 reales.
94
Inevitably, war put the greatest strain on these resources and might impose both modifica-
tionsandadditionstothestructurejustdescribed,asinSicilyinthe1670s.Ontheeveofthe
Messina revolt, the forces’ hospital facilities on the island revolved around the hospital of
Santiago in Palermo. However, once the revolt and the Spanish reconquest had begun, this
was seen to be too far from the front; hence another hospital was established at Milazzo, in
the convent of the Carmen. But this soon proved insufficient, obliging the authorities to
establish additional hospitals in Santa Lucia, and at Belvedere near Milazzo. Yet another
hospital was established at Catania, for the southern front.
95 In 1679, following the defeat
of the Messina rebels, the viceroy of Sicily reformed the existing hospital of Messina
(whose use had been denied the Spanish forces during the rebellion) into three salas,o r
wards, the first of which was to care for the military.
96 An account of 1681 listed five royal
and military hospitals in Sicily: Santiago in Palermo, Milazzo (which had disappeared by
1685), those at Messina and Agusta, and one at Siracusa run by the fathers of the Order of
San Juan de Dios.
97 During the Messina war, the sick of the fleet operating in Sicilian
waters were sent to the Neapolitan hospital of San Giacomo, or Santiago, and that of the
Incurables,
98 while additional hospitals were ordered to be set up.
99
During the Nine Years War (1689–97), too, the existing facilities came under extra-
ordinary pressure, making additional provision necessary. In the summer of 1693 there
89Queen Regent to Don Antonio de Benavides,
Madrid, 20 Nov. 1674, AGS/Cruzada/517; Ferna ´ndez
Duro, op. cit., note 64 above, vol. 3, p. 251.
90Ferna ´ndez Duro, op. cit., note 64 above, vol. 3,
p. 251.
91Ferna ´ndez Duro, op. cit., note 64 above, vol. 3,
pp. 254–9, prints extracts from the regulations of 1633
for the running of this and other royal hospitals.
92ConsultaofJuntadeAprestodeArmadas,13(11)
Feb. 1696, AGS/GA/3876.
93In1700 the Duke of Alburquerque requested that
sick troops in the castle of Santa Catalina (Ca ´diz) be
admittedtothenavalhospital,DonPedroFerna ´ndezde
Navarrete to [?], Ca ´diz, 29 Mar. 1700, AGI/Panama ´/
166, fol. 263. It was subsequently reported that 1,243
men were assembled in Ca ´diz and 317 in San L  u ucar,
manyoftheformerfallingill,andinthehospitalofSan
JuandeDios,Ca ´diz, doctorsfearedanepidemic;itwas
suggestedthattheleviesshouldbestopped,consultaof
Junta[deGuerradeIndias],6April1700,andCountof
la Corzana to [?], Madrid, 5 April 1700, AGI/Panama ´/
166, fols 318–19. Duke of Alburquerque to [?], Puerto
de Santa Marı ´a, 17 May 1700, AGI/Panama ´/166, fols
533–36v, on march of troops from their quarters in
Co ´rdoba, Jae ´n, Ma ´laga, and in Alburquerque’s
captaincy general, which together with five companies
from Melilla (and including those sick in the hospitals
of Ca ´diz, San L  u ucar and Jerez) totalled 2,800 men.
94Consulta of Junta de Armadas, 17 Feb. 1684,
AGS/GA/3709. See also note 32 above.
95According to a contemporary account, this was
staffedbyanadministrator,fourbrothersofSanJuande
Dios, a doctor and two surgeons. The same document,
AGS/E/3498/239, mentions an unspecified number of
Capuchinnurses, besides one doctor and two surgeons.
96Madrid Gazette, sub voce Messina, 9 Feb. 1679,
National Library of Scotland, Astorga Collection.
97Ribot Garcı ´a, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 461–2.
98For the hospital of the Incurables (founded in
1519),seeGentilcore,op.cit.,note13above,pp.126–8.
The hospital of San Giacomo was established c.1550
by a local confraternity of Spaniards, and had strong
links with the (Spanish) military in the realm, although
itlateralsotookinthesickpoor(civilians),ibid.,p.133.
99RibotGarcı ´a,op. cit., note15 above, pp. 217–18.
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Christopher Storrswere so many sick in the Atlantic fleet that the veedor general (inspector general) ordered
the construction of 100 additional beds in the hospital at Ca ´diz.
100 In the winters of 1694–
95andof1695–96,theresourcesofthenavalhospitalinthistownwerefurtherstretchedby
the presence of the sickof the English and Dutch fleets: 300 English seamen were admitted
to the hospital at the end of 1695.
101 As for the galleys, in early 1695, 400 ill men from
these were put on a separate galley because the hospitals were full.
102 The Army of
Catalonia experienced similar problems. In 1673 Barcelona’s general hospital had agreed
to look after the increased number of military casualties which inevitably accompanied the
renewal of hostilities with France; in return the military authorities would provide the
soldiers’ daily pan de municio ´n as well as a small sum of money. The Nine Years War
exacerbated this pressure. The loss of Rosas (1693), and of Gerona and Palamo ´s (1694),
with their military hospitals meant that sick and wounded soldiers had to be cared for in
Barcelona. The viceroy of Catalonia hoped the city’s general hospital would accommodate
them, but it could take only thirty to forty of his men. He therefore sought to recover from
the city authorities the Hospital de la Misericordia, again without success.
103
He did secure the cession in 1694 of the Franciscan Convento de Jes  u us, outside the city
walls for use as a military hospital, but it was a poor alternative. Indeed, according to a
report prepared by the veedor general in February 1696—one which reveals much about
contemporary thinking regarding what we might call the ideal hospital—the convent did
more harm than good. According to the veedor, a hospital should be sufficiently spacious
both to allow the beds to be laid out in rows, thus enabling the doctors, surgeons and other
hospital staff to move freely between them and properly minister to their patients. In
addition, each ward should have sufficient windows for proper ventilation—in order to
disperse the bad odour from the patients’ wounds and admit fresh air—and lighting. The
building should also have water.Unfortunately,the convent was completely inappropriate.
It had been built for a small community of monks, and comprised small, low, dark and
airless cells and dormitories, and narrow cloisters open to the elements. Fitting the soldiers
into these was difficult and meant overcrowding, poor access, and a generally dangerous
(or unhealthy) atmosphere. The inevitable consequence was a high rate of mortality. Not
surprisingly, the soldiers were reluctant to go there, and it was also difficult to find medical
staff and others—chaplains, for example—to serve there, and to replace those who had
died.Theproblemscreatedbythe layoutandstructureoftheconventwere compoundedby
the lack of adequate bedding. According to the veedor, there were just 533 sheets, 551
blankets, 604 straw palliasses and 407 bolsters or pillows. Much of this bedding was so
dirty and decrepit that it carried infection, while there was simply not enough of it to
facilitate regular laundering. In sum, the convent hospital was little more than a death trap.
100Consulta of Junta de Apresto de Armadas,
17 July 1693, on the veedor general of the
Atlantic fleet to [?], 5 July 1693, AGS/GA/3837.
The veedor wanted to appropriate a cargo of wood
from France which had been diverted into Ca ´diz,
declaring that this was the best type of wood for the
beds and that supplies had been disrupted by the
present war.
101Consulta of Junta de Apresto de Armadas,
13 (11) Feb. 1696, AGS/GA/3876.
102Operti to San Tommaso, 25 Feb. 1695,
AST/LM/Napoli, m. 5.
103ConsultaofCouncilofWar,26March1696,and
accompanyingdocuments,abovealltheveedorgeneral
to Marquis of Gasta~ n naga, 27 Feb. 1696, Barcelona,
AGS/GA/3013.
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700The veedor general had a three-pronged solution to these problems—and to the need for
separate wards for officers and men. Firstly, he urged the manufacture or purchase of a
large amount of new bedding, enough for 1,500 beds, for the existing convent hospital.
104
Then, since the location of the hospital ruled out further building, the veedor negotiated
with the general hospital, which was apparently prepared to take up to 200 soldiers. Since
the anticipated number of military patients was expected to be higher, the veedor general
successfully urged the general hospital to agree to works which should accommodate a
further 200 soldiers, doubling its capacity to a total of 400. Fearing this might still not be
sufficient, the veedor general also thought that the authorities of the city of Barcelona
should continue to be pressed to return the Hospital de la Misericordia. These were
ambitious plans. Unfortunately for the sick and wounded of the Army of Catalonia, the
veedor’s suggestions had still not been fully implemented by late June—by which time he
anticipated the influx into the small convent of 800 sick and wounded, crowding the space
and exhausting its beds and bedding.
105 The main explanation was, undoubtedly, lack of
funds.
In wartime, field hospitals were often established to accompany that part of the army
which went on campaign between April and October. In September 1690, the vicar general
(and administrator) of the hospitals of the Army of Lombardy visited Turin to oversee the
field hospital established there for the Spanish troops fighting in Piedmont after the recent
defeat at Staffarda.
106 The needs of the field hospitals were sometimes met at the expense
of the existing hospitals away from the front line. In 1695 the vicar general of the Army of
Catalonia was accused ofmore or less strippingthe conventHospital de Jes  u us of Barcelona
of bedding and kitchen utensils in order to supply a field hospital, removing essential
equipment and jeopardizing the lives of its patients.
107 In fact, however, the field hospi-
tals—which were generally small, with limited facilities—often simply passed on the
soldiers who came to them to the larger, more distant permanent institutions.
108 The
naval forces had their own version of the field hospital: in the summer of 1694, the thirteen
Spanish vessels leaving Ca ´diz to join the Anglo-Dutch vessels commanded by Admiral
Edward Russell included a hospital ship.
109
Oversight of these hospitals was the responsibility of the vicar general of each of the
armies or fleets.
110 In accordance with the preference for the provision of services by
means of asiento, or contract, with independent suppliers, rather than for administra-
cio ´n—the direct administration by state officials—provisioning of the hospitals was
104The veedor also estimated the cost of
constructinga bedcapableofaccommodating twomen
if necessary, and the appropriate bedding: Relacio ´nd e
las piezas de que se deve componer una cama para el
ospittal Real, 27 Feb. 1696, AGS/GA/3013.
105Veedor general to Charles II, 26 June 1696,
Barcelona, AGS/GA/3013.
106Certifico ´ ya el Abad D. Gaspar Casado y
Rosales, Turin, 21 Oct. 1690, AGS/E/3413/90.
107Consulta of Council of War, 13 Feb. 1696,
AGS/GA/3012.
108Veedor general to Charles II, 26 June 1696,
Barcelona, AGS/GA/3013, on the way the facilities in
Barcelona were receiving men from the field hospital.
109See list of Spanish ships which left Ca ´diz, July
1694, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich,
Southwell MSS 3, fol. 95.
110This was certified by the veedor general of the
Armada,aspartoftherelacio ´ndeserviciosofDonJuan
Guerrero, protome ´dico of the Atlantic Fleet, Madrid,
23 Sept. 1688, AGS/GA/Servicios/42.
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Christopher Storrsgenerally contracted out.
111 Typical of the private contractors used in this period was
Estevan Andreu, a merchant of Gerona, who supplied food, fuel and lighting to the
hospital of that town during the Nine Years War, before its loss in 1694, and who in
1696 successfully bid for the contract to run the military hospital in Barcelona for one
year.
112 Occasional inspections of these hospitals, for example of that of Rosas by the
protome ´dico of the Army of Catalonia in March 1685, sought to ensure that they were
being properly run.
113
The day to day operation of the hospitals depended upon a mayordomo, or general
administrator, and various doctors, surgeons, apothecaries and administrators. The
careers of these men can be followed in their relacio ´nes de servicios. Don Juan
Guerrero studied medicine at the University of Alcala ´, and in 1671 passed the
exam qualifying him as protome ´dico. After experience outside the armed forces,
including a stint in plague-dominated Cartagena in 1676, Guerrero served as proto-
me ´dico of the Atlantic fleet between May 1683 and August 1687 when he was obliged
to retire because of his own ill health.
114 Don Juan Jose ´ de Fita y Rı ´os rose from doctor
in the hospital of the important fortress of Palamo ´s (1668–74), with a salary of 15
escudos a month, to doctor of the field hospital (1674–75), on a salary of 25 escudos,
doctor of the entire Army of Catalonia (1675–90), at 30 escudos, and finally proto-
me ´dico of the Army of Catalonia (1690/91–97), with a salary of 50 escudos a month.
From 1697, he also received a bonus of 1 escudo a month for having served with the
garrison of the besieged city of Barcelona that year.
115 Some individuals might rise to
even greater heights, as had happened in the past.
116
The clergy, and in particular the ‘‘hospital’’ orders, played an important part in the
administration of medical services for the armed services. Chief among these latter were
the Hospitallers of St John of God, a Counter-Reformation order whose origins lay in the
establishmentbyStJohn ofahospitalinGranada justbeforehisdeathin1550.Recognized
by Pope Pius V in 1572, the Order, whose members took a special vow to care for the sick,
ran nearly 300 hospitals throughout Europe and in the Americas by 1700.
117 In 1674, at the
request of the king, the head of the Hospital de San Juan de Dios in Barcelona sent thirteen
111The earlier triumph of ‘‘privatization’’ is
explored by Thompson, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 256–73 (and passim).
112Tenderforcontracttorunthemilitaryhospitalof
Barcelona by Estevan Andreu of Gerona (previously
the contractor for the hospital of Gerona), 8 May 1696,
Barcelona, AGS/GA/3013.
113Relacio ´n de los servicios del Doctor Don Juan
Joseph de Fita y Rı´os, Me ´dico de Camara de S.M. y
prothome ´dico del Exe ´rcito de Cataluna, 4 May 1698,
Barcelona, AGS/GM/Servicios/41.
114Relacio ´n de servicios of Don Juan Guerrero,
protome ´dico of the Atlantic fleet, Madrid, 23 Sept.
1688, AGS/GA/Servicios/42. The contribution to this
of the vicario general of the fleet suggests that the
protome ´dico oversaw the cures ordered by doctors
and surgeons.
115Relacio ´n de los servicios del Doctor Don Juan
Joseph de Fita y Rı´os, me ´dico de camara de S.M. y
prothome ´dico del Exe ´rcito de Cataluna, Barcelona,
4 May 1698, AGS/GM/Servicios/41.
116Cristo ´bal Pe ´rez de Herrera served as
protome ´dico of the king’s galleys (from 1580) before
being appointed (1592) a doctor in Philip II’s
household: Michel Cavillac, ‘Noblesse et ambigu€    te ´s
au temps de Cervantes: le cas du docteur Cristo ´bal
Pere ´z de Herrera (1556?–1620)’, Me ´langes de la Casa
de Vela ´zquez, 1975, 11: 177–212.
117Robert Bireley, The refashioning of
Catholicism, 1450–1700: a reassessment of the
Counter-Reformation, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999,
p. 36.
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700members of his order—most of them surgeons—to the Army of Catalonia.
118 On Spain’s
various fleets, shipboard nursing staff often also included members of the Order.
119 In
1696, during the Nine Years War, one Hospitaller of St John of God, fray Clemente Cazo ´n,
servedaszirujanomayor—seniororchiefsurgeon—ofaterciointheArmada, butfellillat
Cartagena when it embarked for Italy. He was later taken prisoner by the north Africans
when sailing for Italy after his cure.
120 From 1697, following his release, Cazo ´n served as
surgeon on various ships of the royal fleet.
121 Members of other religious orders also
helped out, not without reimbursement. During the Nine Years War, the infirmary of the
tertiary Order of San Francisco in Madrid allocated eight of its beds for the care of the
king’s soldiers, in return for 1,000 ducats a year.
122 Military and naval chaplains, too,
played a part in ministering to the sick and wounded.
123
The rest of the nursing staff—variously described as mozos de quadra, ministros, and
servientes—who cared for the sick and wounded under the direction of the doctors are not,
unfortunately, fullyidentifiedinthepaperssenttothe CouncilofWar.Weknow,however,
that they included those no longer able to work as oarsmen aboard the galleys: in the
summer of 1691, twenty-four slaves who were inhaviles, that is unable to man the oars,
served in the hospital.
124
Not all the sick needed or received hospital treatment, or treatment in military or naval
institutions. In 1676 Don Francisco Ve ´lez, captain of cavalry, petitioned the king, saying
that, after twenty-eight years service (in Catalonia and Extremadura) he had suffered
various illnesses in 1674 which made it impossible for him to continue in the army.
He therefore sought an indefinite continuation of his (reformed) officer’s salary until
he was cured. The Council of War was sympathetic, not least because the petition was
accompanied by a supporting surgeon’s certificate. The council therefore suggested, and
the king agreed, that Don Francisco should continue to receive his salary for a year, in the
hope that at the end of that period he could return to the service.
125 Some others were used
to provide second line troops. In the summer of 1692, the Marquis of Legane ´s, having
noticedinareviewoftheSpanishterciosintheArmyofLombardythatmanysoldierswere
unable to campaign because of age, wounds and so on, formed three companies of these
118Consulta of Council of War, 7 Oct. 1676, on
request from Procurador General, AGS/GA/2436.
119Phillips, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 138.
120Consulta of Council of War, 6 July 1696, on
petition from fray Clemente Cazo ´n, AGS/GA/3876.
121See certificate issued by the contador principal,
or chief accountant, of the Armada del Mar Oceano on
behalf of fray Clemente Cazo ´n, AGI/Panama ´/181 fol.
505; and permission of the General of the Hospital
Order of San Juan de Dios for Cazo ´n to serve with the
Armada, as requested by the Count of Ferna ´nN u ~ n nez,
Madrid, 8 Oct. 1696, AGI/Panama ´/181 fol. 505.
122Consulta of Council of War, 3 Oct. 1696, on
petition from Order of St John, AGS/GA/GA/3011.
123SeePhillips,op.cit.,note9above,p.138,forthe
role of the chaplain aboard the Indies fleet as both
administratorinchargeoftheship’smedicinechestand
supervisor of diets for the sick.
124Consulta of State, 15 Oct. 1691, on Count of
Santesteban to [?], 20 July 1691, AGS/E/322, 94.
125Consulta of Council of War, 13 June 1676, on
petition of Don Francisco Ve ´lez, AGS/GA/2348.
Similarly, in 1693 Don Diego Quixano, on the
Spanish galleys, was allowed leave of absence to
cure himself of the ailments from which he suffered
and did subsequently return to the king’s service,
Relacio ´n de servicios of Don Diego Quixano, AGS/
GA/3908. That same year Bernave de Corbello, a
sailor on the ship Atocha, who had been captured by
the French and claimed to have fallen ill while a
prisoner of war, petitioned for the grant already
made to other sailors and was awarded 100 reales so
that he could recuperate and return to the royal
service, consulta of [?], 30 Oct. 1693, AGS/GA/
3837.
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Christopher Storrsand used them to garrison the key fortresses of Cremona, Novara and Alessandria in the
Milanese.
126 Charles II’s forces did not, however, enjoy the prospect of a military hospital
such as the Invalides in Paris (completed in 1676), or the Royal Hospital, Chelsea (com-
pleted in 1692), as did the subjects respectively of the kings of France and England.
127
Details about the treatments and medicines are scarce.
128 However, we know that
medicines purchased and issued to the soldiers who served with the Genoese galleys in
Spanish service in 1670–71 and 1674–76 included various ‘‘syrups’’ (of lemon and so on),
unguents, oils, powders and spirits.
129 But medicines were not the only means to aid the
sick.
130 Another important aspect of the treatment was, inevitably, the diet. According to a
contract agreed in the spring of 1696, those officers and men sent to the royal hospital at
BarcelonaintheConventodeJes  u usweretoreceivenineouncesofmeataday—sixatlunch
and three at dinner—cooked and well seasoned with parsley, saffron and vegetables
appropriate to the patient (as prescribed by the doctor). Those for whom this was not
appropriate would be given chicken or some other substitute. In addition, patients would
receive an allowance of wine.
131
Unfortunately,information about rates of cure are less than satisfactory. Antonio Espino
Lo ´pez has calculated death/survival rates for the Hospital de Santa Cruz (Barcelona)
during the Nine Years War: there the death rate ranged from a low of just over 5.1 per
cent (39of763 men)in1687 (peacetime),toa peak of14.1percent (421of2,974men who
entered the hospital) in 1694 (wartime).
132 There is also some evidence for other institu-
tions scattered among the records of the Council of War. In the autumn of 1696 the
Franciscan tertiaries of Madrid, who were seeking payment of the substantial arrears
owed to them, produced a certificate, based upon their own records and signed by a
royal official. According to this document, in the twelve months between mid-September
1695 and mid-September 1696 the infirmary had cared for a total of 53 soldiers—all of
whom hadtoprove theirmilitaryrecordtogain entry—inthe eightbedsthe orderallocated
to the king’s soldiers. In addition, there were said to be 4 men in the infirmary at the time
the certificate was prepared. This total of 57 included 7 captains (the highest rank) and
126Legane ´s to Charles II, Milan, 4 May 1692,
AGS/E/3417/78.
127Anderson, op. cit., note 6 above, pp. 108–9.
128Forearlierperiods,seeGoodman,op.cit.,note9
above, pp. 248–9;Parker, op. cit., note9 above, p. 168;
and Phillips, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 177–80.
129See lists of medicines purchased for and
consumed and distributed on the Doria galleys,
certified by the barbers of the individual vessels, AGS/
Galeras/17, f. fols 92–9, 673 (1670–71), and fols
499–500, 506, 529, 595 (1674–76). Since these are
essentially accounts, they give only the cost of items
used and no indicationof the real quantity. See also the
details of medicines sent to the Indies from Seville and
Ca ´diz, between 1650 and 1700, in Lutgardo Garcı ´a
Fuentes, El comercio espa~ n nol con Ame ´rica,
1650–1700, Seville, Diputacio ´n Provincial de Sevilla
and Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de
Sevilla, 1980, pp. 317–19, 547–51.
130I ignore the resort to spiritual remedies, such as
religious processions and so on, for which see L J
Andrew Villalo ´n, ‘Putting Don Carlos together again:
treatment of a head injury in sixteenth-century Spain’,
Sixteenth Century Journal, 1995, 26: 347–65, p. 356.
131See contract to supply provisions for those
officersand mensent to the Conventode Jes  u us hospital
of Barcelona agreed with Estevan Andreu of Gerona, 8
May 1696, Barcelona, AGS/GA/3013; and Espino
Lo ´pez, Catalunya, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 225n40.
Foranearlierperiod,seePhillips,op.cit.,note9above,
pp. 177–80.
132Espino Lo ´pez, Catalunya, op. cit., note 14
above, p. 225; Espino Lo ´pez, ‘Enfermedad y muerte’,
op. cit., note 14 above, pp. 436–43.
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–170033 simple soldiers, the single largest category. Two of the latter had been cared for in the
Franciscan infirmary twice. Of the 53 soldiers who had been treated hitherto, 10 had died,
a rate of 17.5 per cent.
133
Besides looking after those who were already sick, efforts were also made to prevent the
troops from falling ill in the first place. Individual commanders were wary of allowing
infected men to come into contact with their own.
134 Everywhere, military regulations
generally included orders regarding hygiene; they also sought to get rid of the prostitutes
and other camp followers who spread venereal infections.
135 In late seventeenth-century
Spain, recruiting captains were often instructed not to accept as recruits young men with
contagious infections,
136 although the difficulty in raising men no doubt meant that many
captains welcomed anybody and everybody who came forward. In Spain itself, there was
frequently an interruption of campaigning at the height of summer, when it was simply too
hot (and when to campaign risked losing men).
137 Some effort was also made to fit recruits
to the theatres in which they were to serve: Galicia in the north-west, with its wet climate,
continued to be regarded as an ideal recruiting ground for Flanders since men levied there
would adapt more easily to the rainy Low Countries.
138
This was not all. In the winter of 1692–93, in the course of discussion in the Council of
War about the levy of1,800 men in Spain, for Flanders,it was urged that instead of holding
the men raised until the entire force had been levied and then sending them en bloc to
Flanders, those recruited should be sent in batches of 400 to 500. One of the arguments
advanced in favour of this was that it would prevent illness.
139 A concern for the health of
the troops and their subsequent effectiveness also influenced army operations. In 1692,
as the campaign drew to a close, the Council of State was unwilling to allow units of the
Army of Lombardy to spend the winter in Dauphine ´ because it feared the impact on the
health (and numbers) of the troops, particularly given the lack of means (i.e. funds) and
Dauphine ´’s inability to support the troops.
140 Other preventive measures included the
provision of tents, to protect the men against the elements while on campaign. In
133Consulta of Council of War, 3 Oct. 1696, on
petitionfromtheOrderoftheFranciscans,andenclosed
relacio ´n,AGS/GA/3011.Thefateofthefourremaining
soldiers is unclear.
134In 1664 the Duke of Tursi feared that sick
troops embarked on his galleys would infect his
crews, Don Carlo Doria Carretto to Don Pedro
Ferna ´ndez del Campo, Barcelona, 25 Mar. 1664,
AGS/E/3611/123.
135Tallett, op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 107, 124,
132–3.
136See Instruccio ´n que se a de observar en la
formazio ´n de las diez companias de infantes que se
an de levantar por los capitanes que bienen de
Flandes para reclutar los tercios de espa~ n noles que
sirven en aquellos estados; and Instruccio ´n que se ha
de observar por el se~ n nor presidente de la
chancillerı´a de Valladolid en la formacion y leva de
las companias que se han de levantar en la dha
ciudad por los capitanes que vienen de Flandes,
AGS/GA/2916.
137For the persistence of this practice after 1700,
see HenryKamen,FelipeV:elreyquereino ´dosveces,
Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2000, p. 55 (1704).
138Manuel Marı ´a de Artaza, Rey, reino y
representacio ´n: la Junta General del reino de Galicia,
Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas, 1998, p. 282. Although Artaza’s evidence
isfrom1702,suchopinionswereexpressedearlier.One
formerarmyadministrator,whopresumablyknewwhat
he was talking about, also believed that, because
Galicia was poor, its population made good soldiers
because they could survive on very little, Juan Alfonso
de Lancina, Comentarios polı´ticos, Madrid, 1689, ed.
Jose ´ Antonio Maravall, Madrid, 1945, p. 63.
139ConsultaofCouncilofWar,11Feb.1693,AGS/
E/3887. The other reasons were to avoid expense and
desertion.
140Consulta of State, 25 Sept. 1692, on Legane ´st o
Charles II, 5 Sept. 1692, AGS/E/3417/96 and
Consulta of State, 30 Oct. 1692 on Legane ´s to Charles
II, 4 and 12 Oct. 1692, AGS/E/3417/105, 106 and 109.
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Christopher Storrs1692, the Marquis of Legane ´s ordered the purchase of material for the making of tents, 100
for the infantry and 65 for the cavalry of the Army of Lombardy, in preparation for the
invasion of Dauphine ´.
141 The following year, the Admiral of Castile declared to his
colleagues in the junta of the lieutenants-general, a sort of war cabinet that operated
between 1693 and 1695, that the provision of tents was one of the most essential and
necessary services in any army and claimed to have introduced the use of tents into the
Army of Lombardy when he was governor and captain-general of Milan (1678–86). The
other members of the junta agreed and suggested that the king order the manufacture of
2,500 tents for the 12,500 infantry—that is one tent for five men—and 1,200 tents for the
cavalry of the Army of Catalonia for the next (1694) campaign. Unfortunately, it is not
clear whether the king implemented the suggestion: his response suggested that he was
concerned to know the cost before taking it further.
142
The Main Problem: Shortage of Funds
Medical provision in Spain’s armies and navies did not always work well. Medicines
mightoftenbelacking,exhaustedbyextraordinarydemand.In1684,accordingtothevicar
general of the Army of Catalonia, 700 men died in the hospital of Gerona for want of
medicines—and because of the mutual infection of men sharing the beds.
143 The ability to
despatch urgently needed medical supplies, for example to Oran in 1696,
144 was made
easier by the fact that the western Mediterranean was a ‘‘Spanish lake’’, ringed by Spain
and its possessions in Italy and dotted with Spanish islands: the galleys could always put in
at a friendly port and request fresh supplies of medicine, as did the Duke of Na ´jera at
Naples in December 1695.
145 Nevertheless, men sometimes died for want of proper
treatment. Other problems included the failure of commanders and officials to co-operate
in the care and cure of the sick. In 1684 the Count of Aguilar, commander of the Atlantic
fleet, complained at the failure of the authorities in Cartagena to provide for more than 400
sick aboard hisvessels: the governor, he claimed, had granted him just three days supply of
meat and medicines.
146
But the fundamental problem was lack of funds, the besetting difficulty of Habsburg
Spain. It is widely held that Spain retreated from its imperial commitments in this period,
not least because of the cost and the desire to relieve the king’s hard pressed Castilian
subjects of a fiscal burden which had increased enormously under Philip IV (1621–65), but
141Consulta of Council of Italy, 16 Nov. 1692, on
Legane ´st o[ ?], 8 Aug. 1692, AGS/E/3417/175.
142Consulta of Junta of Lieutenants-General, 30
Dec. 1693, AGS/GA/2913. I have searched succeeding
legajos without success to discover the outcome of this
proposal; this amply demonstrates the difficulties
facing the researcher seeking to use the voluminous
Council of War series. The introduction and
generalization throughout Europe’s armies of such
practical (health-preserving) measures as field tents
awaits proper study.
143Don Damia ´n Caro to Lo ´pez de Zarate, 12 Aug.
1684, AGS/GA/2610, cited by Espino Lo ´pez,
Catalunya, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 61.
144Consulta of Council of War, 6 Feb. 1696, on
report from one of the royal boticarios, AGS/GA/
3012. The cost of these medicines, sent from the
royal botica, totalled 12,780 reales (including
packaging). Their weight—500 arrobas (about
5,750kg)—however meant that it cost a further 500
reales to transport the medicines to Cartagena from
Madrid.
145Duke of Na ´jera to [Charles II?], Naples, 25 Feb.
1695, AGS/E, leg. 3326/17.
146Consulta of Junta de Armadas, 28 Jan. 1684, on
letter from Count of Aguilar, Cartagena, 22 Jan. 1684,
AGS/GA/2608.
345
Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700which was much harder to bear in a period of economic downturn.
147 The reign of Charles
II certainly saw some relaxation of the demands imposed on the king’s subjects.
148
However, the king and his ministers remained committed to the preservation of the
monarchy, and in 1695, for example, imposed what was in effect a new salt tax at the
height of the Nine Years War to fund imperial defence.
149 Nevertheless, the cost of war
frequently outstripped the funds available to Charles II and his ministers,
150 and the king’s
armies and navies suffered in consequence.
Hospitals and medical provision absorbed a tiny proportion of military spending. This,
too, is a subject difficult to penetrate, given the paucity of budgets and the complexity and
delayofSpanishaccountingprocedures.Nevertheless,somedataisavailable.Inthewinter
of 1676–77 it was claimed that the Army of Catalonia needed regular payments of 115,219
escudos a month. Of these the hospitals took only 4,000 escudos a month (whereas
fortifications took 10,000 and the pay of 43,000 infantrymen and 4,000 cavalrymen
just under 60,000 escudos).
151 In general, medical services represented a very small
proportion of total army spending, as in the past.
152 In 1697, the Marquis of Legane ´s
claimed that the Army of Lombardy needed just 20,000 escudos (a little over 3.5 per cent)
for hospitals out of a total of 590,000 escudos.
153 The galley fleets conformed to this
pattern too. Expenditure on medicines on one of the galleys of the Duke of Tursi totalled
175 Genoese libras, just over 1 per cent of a total expenditure of 16,973 libras.
154 Some-
times these services absorbed a lesser proportion. In 1693, when calculating the costs of a
levy of 1,000 men in the realm of Galicia for Flanders, the captain-general included
medicines, the salaries of doctors, surgeons and others serving in the hospitals, totalling
12,000 reales (just over 2.1 per cent) of a total bill of 549,540 reales.
155 But on occasion
medical provision was more expensive. In the winter of 1677, the cost of hospitals within
Spain (for its garrisons) for 1678 was budgeted at 52,012 escudos, just under 10 per cent of
147According to I A A Thompson, ‘‘‘Money,
money,and yet more money!’’ Finance,the fiscal-state
and the military revolution: Spain 1500–1650’, in
Rogers (ed.), op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 273–98, on
p. 287, Charles II’s reign ‘‘saw the collapse of internal
authority, a tax-freeze, and the retreat of Spain from
hegemonic conflict. The three were closely
interrelated’’.
148Juan Antonio Sa ´nchez Bele ´n, La polı´tica fiscal
en Castilla durante el reinado de Carlos II, Madrid,
Siglo XXI de Espa~ n na, 1996, pp. 213–56.
149Julio D Mu~ n noz Rodrı ´guez, Damus ut des: los
servicios de la ciudad de Murcia a la corona a finales
del siglo XVII, Murcia, Real Academia Alfonso X el
Sabio, 2003, pp. 129–32.
150Spain’s financial difficulties in this period are
explored by Manuel Garzo ´n Pareja, La hacienda de
Carlos II, Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1980,
and Sa ´nchez Bele ´n, op. cit., note 148 above.
151ConsultaofCouncilofWar,12Jan.1676,AGS/
GA/2353.
152Between 1634 and 1641 the military hospital of
the Army of Flanders, with its 330 beds, represented 1
per cent of the expenditure of the Army of Flanders,
Parker, op. cit. note 9 above, p. 167n3.
153Consulta of State, 21 Oct. 1696 on Legane ´s’s
reportofcosts,AGS/E/3423/163,164.Thelargestsums
were for the bread supply (180,000 escudos) and the
Artillery Train (100,000 escudos).
154Report of Alessandro and Estevan Doria, and
attached certificate, [1691], AGS/Comisaria de
Cruzada/365.
155Consulta of Junta of Lieutenants-General, 15
Nov. 1693, on Count of Palma to [?], Coru~ n na, 31 Oct.
1693 and enclosed Gastos de una leva de mil hombres
para Flandes, AGS/GA/2916. The real was equivalent
to 34 maravedı´s, and the escudo to 340 maravedı´s.
Thus, one escudo was worth 10 reales. Carlos Alvarez
Nogal, El cre ´dito de la monarquı´a hispa ´nica en el
reinado de Felipe IV, Valladolid, Junta de Castilla y
Leo ´n, 1997, p. 10.
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156 Why expenditure here represented so large a
proportion of anticipated costs is unclear, but an unusual increase in the level of illness
might mean spending in excess of the sum allocated in advance,
157 as did the need to
provide for the sick aboard the English fleet which wintered at Ca ´diz between December
1695 and March 1696: it was reported that this cost the town’s hospitals an additional
43,712 silver reales.
158
Small as they were, payments were often long overdue. In July 1676 Don Juan de
Gasio ´n, the boticario mayor (chief apothecary or pharmacist) of the Army of Catalonia,
petitioned for payment of the fifteen months salary owed to him.
159 The consequences
could be drastic for medical provision. Towards the end of the 1676 campaign, the head of
San Juan de Dios, Barcelona, complained at the lack of means to attend to the sick of the
Army of Catalonia in the hospital.
160 These problems, which were exacerbated in wartime,
inevitably recurred during the Nine Years War. By August 1693 the general hospital in
Barcelona was owed more than 50,000 reales for its treatment of the men of the Army of
Catalonia;
161 and as late as June 1696, Gasio ´n had no money to prepare the botica,o r
pharmacy, for the campaign.
162 More seriously, shortage of funds prevented the full
implementation of the proposals of the veedor general to expand and improve military
hospital provision in Barcelona: the general hospital refused to go ahead unless the arrears
owed to it were paid and the authorities in Madrid advanced the funds for the expansion of
the hospital’s facilities, while nobody would bid for the contract to make 600 new beds
without the promise of a substantial advance. At the same time, inadequate funding of the
field hospital meant that it passed on more and more men to the already overburdened and
inadequate convent hospital of Jes  u us.
163
These problems were not confined to Catalonia. In 1691, the newly-arrived governor of
Milan, the Marquis of Legane ´s, having delayed his departure from Madrid in order to
ensure that he went with money to fund his forces, gave just 6,000 (2 per cent) of the
300,000 escudos he had brought with him from Spain, for not only hospitals but also the
purchase of horses and of clothes for the infantry.
164 In April 1692, Legane ´s, who was
preparing for the coming campaign, declared that he would have great difficulty if he were
not sent money to pay for the hospitals (and the artillery train, bread supply and other
campaign necessities).
165 In October 1695, Legane ´s complained of the debts he had
156Relacio ´n de los presidios de Espa~ n na y Africa,
considered by Junta de las disposiciones generales,
18 Nov. 1677, AGS/E/1947/212, 213.
157Cf. Consulta of Council of War, 19 Oct. 1684,
on Duke of [Canizano ?]t o[ ?], 2 Oct. 1684, AGS/
GA/2609.
158Consulta of Junta de Apresto de Armadas,1 6
(14)April1696,onletterfromtheveedorgeneralofthe
Armada (with a receipt from the mayordomo of the
hospital), AGS/GA/3876.
159Charles II to Marquis of Zerralvo, 1 July 1676,
orderingpaymentofwhateverwasowedtoDonJuande
Gasio ´n, and promptpayment of his salary in the future,
AGS/GA/2360.
160Consulta of Council of War, 7 Oct. 1676, on
representation of the procurador general, AGS/GA/
2346.
161Consulta of [?], 22 Aug. 1693, on report from
administrator of the hospital, AGS/GA/3013.
162VeedorgeneraltoCharlesII,Barcelona,26June
1696, AGS/GA/3013.
163ConsultaofCouncilofWar,12May1696,AGS/
GA/3013.
164Legane ´s to Charles II, Milan, 11 June 1691,
AGS/E/3415/17.
165Legane ´s to Charles II, Milan, 11 April 1692,
AGS/E/3416/147. Subsequently, Legane ´s declared
that, just two months into the campaign, he must do
without the artillery train, hospitals and so on unless
urgently helped, Legane ´s to Charles II, Milan, 17 May
1692, and Noticia de los medios que se han tenido este
a~ n no y la formaen que se han distribuido, AGS/E/3417/
23, 24.
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166 The Atlantic fleet
also suffered in this way: in the winter of 1684–85 the meat supplier to the hospital of that
forceatCa ´dizwasstillseeking paymentforprovisionssuppliedin1679–80.
167Institutions
away from the front, in the capital, did not escape either: the Franciscan tertiaries had to
request, in the autumn of 1696, 1,000 ducats due to them for the eight beds they made
available in Madrid, and that the sum be assigned on (i.e. paid out of) a more reliable
revenue in the future.
168
The king and his ministers attempted to bridge the funding gap in so far as it affected
military and naval hospitals by seeking extraordinary contributions towards the costs of
these from the clergy. During the Nine Years War, in the spring of 1691, for example,
Charles II sought charitable donations towards the costs of the hospital of the Army of
Catalonia from the dean and chapter of the cathedral of Lugo (Galicia),
169 and other
ecclesiastical institutions; and again, in 1693 and 1696 asked various ecclesiastics for
help with the funding of the same hospital.
170 Some, including the bishops of Jae ´n and
Sevillein1693,didcontribute.
171Butnotall.In1691thedeanandchapterofLugorejected
the king’s request, pleading their notorious poverty. For their part, the archbishops of
Santiago and Seville, who had agreed some years before that each would give the hospital
of the Atlantic fleet at Ca ´diz 6,000 ducats a year, were said in 1696 to owe considerable
arrears—weakening the ability of the hospital to provide adequate medical care.
172
The ability of Charles II and his ministers to ensure effective medical services in his
armed forces was thus undermined by the chronic financial difficulties that had long
dogged Spain’s armies and navies.
173 Money to fund services—pay, clothing, food, lodg-
ingorcover,transportandsoon,whichmighthavepreventedthemenfromfallingillinthe
first place—was slow to arrive and often insufficient when it did so; the same was true of
the funds needed to sustain the medical services once the men had fallen ill.
Conclusion
It is difficult to compare the numbers of sick and wounded in the Spanish armed forces
between 1665 and 1700 and the effectiveness of their treatment either with those in the
same forces before 1665, or with those in the forces of other states in the same period
166Consulta of State, 12 Nov. 1695, on Legane ´s
to Charles II, Milan, 20 Oct. 1695, AGS/E/3422/122,
123.
167Consulta of Junta de Armadas, 1 Feb. 1685,
AGS/GA/3709.
168Consulta of Council of War, 3 Oct. 1696, on
petition from the Order of San Juan, AGS/GA/GA/
3011.
169Dean and chapter of Lugo cathedral to Charles
II, 27 May 1691, AGS/E/4171.
170Consulta of Council of War, 27 June 1696,
AGS/GA/3013.
171[?] to Marquis of Villanueva, 31 March 1693,
and [?] to same, 21 April 1693, AGS/GA/2946.
172Consultas of Junta de Apresto de Armadas,5
Marchand 16April1696,AGS/GA/3876.SeeAntonio
Domı ´nguez Ortiz, La sociedad espa~ n nola en el siglo
XVII, II: El estamento eclesia ´stico, Madrid, Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Cientı ´ficas, 1970, p. 209.
173Parker, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 132.
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174 or because the necessary
primary source material does not exist (or has not been discovered). For the same reason,
merelycomparing rates ofsickness andcurebetweenthe different forces ofCharlesIIisno
easy task. What is clear, however, is that Spain’s armed forces, like those of other states,
suffered constant attrition from sickness, which on occasion rivalled desertion as the great
source of loss of military manpower. The sick and wounded and their treatment were a
major concern of Spanish military officials. Loss of men through illness was taken for
granted and built into calculations about army strength: in November 1693, it was said that
1,100 men recruited really meant—with losses by flight, ill health and death—1,000 men
serving at the front.
175 While some illnesses were common to civilians and soldiers alike,
others were either unique—or nearly so—to the profession of arms or were the conse-
quence of the stresses and strains of military life. The king, his generals and ministers, as
we have seen, clearly felt obliged—on both practical and moral grounds—to do something
for those in the king’s service, a concern echoed in numerous treatises on the conduct of
war.
176 This meant maintaining and—particularly in wartime—expanding medical ser-
vices developed in earlier reigns, which were an integral part of Spain’s role as a military
innovator in the ‘‘military revolution’’.
Unfortunately—and despite arguments to the effect that medical science was resurgent
inSpain fromabout 1680
177—thatprovisionwas notalways effective inthe lastdecadesof
Spanish Habsburg rule. The inadequacies of the Spanish military medical services in the
lateseventeenthcenturyinsomerespectsreflectedthedifficulties incurredinattemptingto
face the challenges (in terms, for example, of new types of wound) posed by the ‘‘military
revolution’’.Inthisrespect,Spain’s failingswere bynomeansunique.However,the extent
of illness reflected some of Spain’s real difficulties—notably demographic setbacks and
their impact onrecruitment—while theweaknesses of Spanishmilitarymedicine were also
the result of that fundamental problem which dogged all aspects of government in late
seventeenth-century Spain, lack of money. Shortage of funds, often the indirect cause of
sickness among the troops, also had the inevitable consequence that many of those who did
fall ill, or who were wounded, received poor treatment and even died. In some respects
little had changed since the reign of Philip II when, as David Goodman has observed, war
stimulated the provision of medical care for the king’s troops but also exhausted the funds
necessary to make that care effective.
178
174John A Lynn, Giant of the grand si  e ecle: the
Frencharmy,1610–1715,CambridgeUniversityPress,
1997, pp. 420–6, the most recent survey of the French
army in the seventeenth century provides an excellent
account of the development of medical services within
that force but gives no figures regarding the extent of
the problem or rates of cure.
175Consulta of Council of War, 18 Nov. 1693,
AGS/GA/2916.
176FD a ´vila Orejo ´n Gasto ´n, Polı´tica y meca ´nica
militar para sargento mayor de tercio, Madrid, 1669,
p. 195, urged the victorious commander to ensure the
despatch to hospitals of his wounded after any battle.
177See Henry Kamen, Spain in the later
seventeenth century 1665–1700, Harlow, Longman,
1980, pp. 322–4.
178Goodman, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 250.
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Sickness and Medical Services in Spain’s Armed Forces c. 1665–1700International comparisons are not easy, but medical provision in the Spanish armed
forces was probably better than that of England (at least before the War of the Spanish
Succession, when the English government began to respond more effectively to the
challenge of sustained continental conflict from 1689), though inferior to that of the
Dutch Republic
179 and to that of Spain’s main competitor between 1665 and 1700,
France.
180
The advent of the new Bourbon dynasty in Spain in 1700, in the person of Louis XIV’s
grandson,PhilipV,andtheintroductionofFrenchmethods,
181seemstohaveinaugurateda
period of improvement in this sphere of government activity, as in many others: this was
exemplified in new instructions for the organization and operation of military hospitals in
1708 during the War of the Spanish Succession.
182 Nevertheless, long after 1700 the sick
and wounded remained as serious a threat to the effectiveness of the armies and navies of
BourbonSpainastheyhadbeentoitsHabsburgpredecessor,
183andtheirtreatmentamajor
challenge to the Spanish authorities’ ability to provide effective medical services for their
troops.
184
179SeetheEnglishandDutchmedicalprovisionfor
their forces in Flanders in the Nine Years War as
outlinedbyJohnChilds,TheBritisharmyofWilliamIII
1689–1702, Manchester University Press, 1987,
pp. 157–9; and hospital services in the contemporary
Englishnavy,as surveyedin JohnEhrman,The navyin
the war of William III, 1689–1697, Cambridge
University Press, 1953, pp. 126–7, 441–5. For English
provision in the War of the Spanish Succession, see
Steele, and Gask, both op. cit., note 4 above.
Unfortunately, E Gruber von Arni, Hospital care and
the British standing army, 1660–1714, Aldershot,
Ashgate, 2006, appeared too late for consultation.
180However, we should not ignore the defects of
French army medical services in this period, see
Rowlands, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 97–8, 227.
181Henry Kamen, The war of succession in Spain
1700–1715, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1969, pp. 42–56; and Concepcio ´n de Castro, Al a
sombra de Felipe V: Jose ´ de Grimaldo, ministro
responsable (1703–1726), Madrid, Marcial Pons,
2004, passim.
182AGS/Secretarı ´a de Guerra/Suplemento/269
(Hospitales, 1713–70).
183When Tortona (north Italy) surrendered to the
forces of the King of Sardinia in 1746, during the
War of the Austrian Succession, the Spanish troops
in the garrison there totalled 3,384. Of these, 303
were already in hospital and another 17 required
hospitalization, a total of nearly 10 per cent, see
table in AST/Materie Militari/Imprese Militari,
m. 6/9.
184In1721theMarquisofTolosa,SecretaryofState
for War, the Navy and the Indies, was arrested for his
links with the company that had the contract to
provision the Spanish army in north Africa, and which
hadsuppliedfoodofsuchpoorqualitythatonreturning
to Spain the sick soldiers had filled the hospitals of
Andalucı ´a: Santos Madrazo, Estado de ´bil y ladrones
poderosos en la Espa~ n na del siglo XVIII: historia de un
peculado en el reinado de Felipe V, Madrid, Catarata,
2000, p. 69.
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